2. The Mind-Body Problem

I’ll open with Wilber’s own account of our differences regarding the mind-body problem. I make the point in my JCS paper that he seems very confused about this knotty philosophical issue—and his response, effectively repeating his original position, reinforces this impression. Wilber:

Once again I came away from reading this section with basically no idea what to make of it. So I might not convey this part of my response very well, and I hope I don’t misrepresent what de Quincey is trying to say, because once again I feel he has some fine points. Also, although I tried as hard as I could to make chapter 14 in Integral Psychology (which discusses these three meanings) as clear as possible, I am now—given de Quincey’s reading of that chapter—worried that I didn’t succeed very well at all, so allow me to try to simplify and summarize. Here are the three different meanings of the mind-body problem that I believe are quite common and that I carefully outline in Integral Psychology:

(1) For the average person, “mind” often means my conceptual, willing, and intentional self, and “body” often means my emotions, sensations, felt somatic sense, and so on.

(2) For many cognitive scientists and various materialists, “mind” means “brain” and “body” means organism. In this usage, the brain in the body or in the organism.

(3) For many philosophers, “mind” means “interiors” and body means “exteriors”—or, in general terms, mind means “subject” and body means “object,” so that the mind-body problem ultimately means the relation between subject and object. Explicitly following the great nondual wisdom traditions (such as Vedanta and Vajrayana), I divide this meaning into two subdivisions: relative and absolute (as I will explain)—call them 3a and 3b.

He then goes on to say: “de Quincey dismisses two of the three important meanings of the mind-body problem that I think we should honor.” Correct. I focus on the mind-body problem, referred to variously as “the hard problem,” or the “world knot.” This is perhaps the major philosophical or ontological issue of our time (for the past four hundred years since Descartes established the dualism of body and soul). Wilber’s other “important meanings” have psychological and/or neuroscientific significance (by comparison they involve “easy problems”), but are irrelevant to the tough philosophical problem.

The mind-body problem is the famous “world knot” described by Schopenhauer in the 19th century; and, more recently, the “explanatory gap” identified by Joseph Levine. It is the “hard problem,” as identified by Max Velmans and David Chalmers, and discussed so vigorously in the past few years by some of today’s leading philosophers and mind-body theorists. From the perspective of this problem (a fundamental ontological conundrum), Wilber’s meanings (1) and (2) are, as I say, irrelevant (though of interest psychologically).

There is no explanatory or ontological gap—no hard problem—involved in Wilber’s meanings (1) and (2). But Wilber does mix these into his discussion of the hard problem, and that is what I criticize. It does betray a confusion about what the hard problem really is: How is it that mind/consciousness exists in an otherwise physical universe, and that both mind and matter causally interact?

Bringing into the discussion what the “average person” means by “mind” or “body” is not relevant because, as defined by Wilber, both are actually aspects of consciousness. Same for the second meaning of the mind-body problem used, Wilber says, by cognitive scientists and materialists: There is no hard problem here because “mind” is reduced to brain. The issue of subjectivity in an objective universe is typically sidestepped or ignored by materialists (one laudable exception is Nicholas Humphrey).

So, this is the nub of my critique of Wilber’s treatment of the mind-body problem in IP. It’s a critique he doesn’t address, except by his by now all-too-familiar tactic of distortion. He says: “. . . but then [de Quincey] once again subtly retracts his entire criticism, acknowledging that ‘Wilber’s [view] can offer a solution of the subject-object relation . . .’”

First, I did not—and do not—“subtly retract”— my “entire criticism” of Wilber’s treatment of the mind-body problem. By reintroducing meanings (1) and (2) of mind and body in his response, Wilber reinforces my opinion that he does not yet understand the key issue, and that he is confused about the “hard” mind-body problem when he brings in the other meanings of mind and body. My original criticism stands, and Wilber has done nothing to address it.

Second, where Wilber inserted the bracketed word “view” in the above quote from me, I had originally written “prehension-enriched quadrants.” I deliberately did so to point out that it is not Wilber’s quadrant model per se that may provide a solution to the mind-body problem but Whitehead’s process theory. It is only because Wilber borrows Whitehead’s notion of “prehension”—implying a process view—that the quadrant model may be able to offer a solution. I go on to say: “But, in that case, it is not Wilber’s model that supplies the solution, it is Whitehead’s (which Wilber has assimilated into his own).”

Wilber acknowledges this is correct. But then goes on to attempt another “coup distortion” or, at best, throws in another red-herring:

Since I have assimilated Whitehead’s prehension into my model, and since that does solve the mind-body problem in de Quincey’s view, then my model does solve the mind-body problem. In this regard, it does not matter that part of my model is explicitly adapted from Whitehead (with full acknowledgement). It matters only that my model, by de Quincey’s yardstick, has solved the problem. At one stroke de Quincey once again erases his major criticism of my stance (an erasure that is, also again, buried in a footnote).

But notice also: when he says that it is "not Wilber’s model but Whitehead’s," he has badly overstated the case. Whitehead does not have the quadrants . . . De Quincey robs me of any contributions to the mind-body problem, precisely because the only mind-body problem he recognizes is #3a.

First—What exactly is the problem in #3b (or #1 or #2 for that matter)? As I’ll explain shortly, any problem with #1, development of psychological states (all interiors), is comparatively “easy” (it does not encounter the ontological gap that the interior-exterior relation does). Same for #2, cognitive- or neuroscientific challenges in understanding mental functions or neuro-cerebral structures/processes: they are comparatively easy—no ontological gap to contend with. So, what about #3b, the transrational, nondual reality? Just what is the mind-body problem there? Seems to me that Wilber’s claim to have solved the mind-body problem is precisely the assertion that at the transrational level the mind-body problem is transcended! So, no problem. That leaves us with #3a, the true ontological problem of explaining how real minds interact with real bodies. Yes, that is the only “hard” mind-body problem I recognize. Not only do I admit that, I’m emphatic about it. And because Wilber still doesn’t seem to recognize the crucial uniqueness of #3a (how interior/subject/mind could be related to exterior/object/body), I continue to think he is having a hard time grasping why including a discussion of #1, #2 and #3b when attempting to address the real “hard problem” just confuses the issue.

Second, and consequently—No, I did not erase my major criticism of Wilber’s mind-body stance, not at all. To clarify: What I mean is that if there is a solution to the mind-body problem it is not provided by Wilber’s static and spatial quadrant model (which portrays interiors and exteriors, mind and body, subject and object in spatial relationship) but by Whitehead’s dynamic, process philosophy, where interiors/minds/subjects and exteriors/bodies/objects are related temporally. (I’ll have more to say on this in a moment. But first, I want to address another of Wilber’s perceived, and projected, ad hominems.) He says:

“ . . . after he has excoriated me for totally misunderstanding the mind-body problem, completely misrepresenting Whitehead, and also being a really nasty person to boot.”

Fact is, I never said, nor implied, that Wilber is a “really nasty person.” I do say, and remain explicit about this, that Wilber’s engagement with theoretical opponents quite often feeds into what I’ve dubbed “The Great Chain of Being Nasty.” His response to my critique is a case in point.

Actually, I’m sure that Ken is just a regular guy—with character warts and blemishes like the rest of us, but also, no doubt, capable of moments and periods of being affable and charming. I did smile at his injection of self-deprecating humor in his response: “de Quincey cuts and splices my three meanings with my three proposed solutions in a way that makes me look like a complete idiot, whereas all my good friends know that I am only a partial idiot.”

I’m sure that’s true. And that’s he’s a partial genius, too.

But he’s wrong about my “cutting and splicing” his three meanings with his proposed solutions. As I’ve said, he did mix up the different meanings in a confusing way. I did readers the service of untangling them, and in the process it became clear that what Wilber was actually saying was either a tautology or an avoidance of any real solution to the mind-body problem.

He then goes on, in his response, to attempt a further clarification of what he means by “mind” and “body,” and claims that “the first aspect of the mind-body problem is actually something that developmental psychologists have gone a long way toward solving.” Perhaps. But this is a red-herring. It throws no light whatsoever on the “hard” philosophical mind-body problem.

By the way, Wilber repeats the same conceptual error when discussing the mind-body relation in his psychological developmental theory. He wants to insist that the “body is in the mind.” This can be true only from the perspective of an idealist. What I tried to show in my JCS paper is that what Wilber really means is that “the feelings of the body are in the mind.” (He actually says: “The felt body is in the mind.”) Clearly, it is nonsense to say that the physical body is in the mind (unless we adopt the idealist reductionist stance of reducing all of physical reality to mind). On the other hand, it is tautologically true to say “the feelings of the body are in the mind,” or “the felt body is in the mind.”

In his response to my paper, Wilber acknowledges none of this. Instead, he claims: “de Quincey seems to have trouble holding all of these perspectives in mind and honoring the importance of each.” He’s referring here to my dismissal of two of his three meanings of the mind-body problem. Actually, I have no trouble at all holding all three perspectives, nor in recognizing their importance. But there is a decisive difference between the psychological importance and the philosophical importance. I do, as a matter of fact, honor the importance of integrating different modes and levels of mind (consciousness or self) in psychological development. In interpersonal relations, such integration is crucially important. I know from personal experience how difficult—yet how crucial—it is to integrate my feelings with my cognitive abilities. (I have written about this in my article “Consciousness: Truth or Wisdom?” published in IONS Review, and available on my website www.deepspirit.com .) I also honor and value the importance of understanding developments in neuroscience that inform us about the way the brain works, and how this knowledge can help us understand the importance of the functioning of neurological correlates of consciousness.

But none of this helps us one iota in addressing the “hard” mind-body problem. Problems in developmental psychology or neuroscience do not translate into variations of the mind-body problem. They are, as I say, comparatively, “easy problems.” This is not to deny there may be great difficulty in actually solving problems in these areas. But, for the most part, these are technical or procedural difficulties, and we may expect that they will be solved with developments in their respective fields. But this is not the case with the “hard” mind-body problem. We can’t conceive, even in principle, how to solve this problem. It thoroughly baffles the powers of rationality and intellect to even begin to know how to solve it—unless we at least make the counter-intuitive paradigm shift from substance- to process-thinking. (Which is what Whitehead did. His process approach seems to offer the best that reason can provide: It switches thinking about the mind-body problem from a relationship that occurs in space to one that occurs in time [see my JCS essay, “Past Matter, Present Mind”].)

The first two kinds of problems that Wilber identifies (in developmental psychology and in neuroscience) are essentially empirical. By contrast, the “hard” mind-body problem is conceptual and logical. We don’t have the conceptual categories that would allow us to bridge the explanatory gap—because the “gap” separates two ontologically incompatible domains. (In Whitehead, because his mind-body solution is temporal, there is no “gap.” Instead, there is the temporal continuity of the present moment [where subjectivity is] inevitably slipping into the past [creating objects for the next moment of subjectivity].)

Given all the impressive work that Wilber has achieved in the area of developmental psychology, I’m sure that the problems and issues encountered there deeply fascinate him. I’m glad that he, and many other theorists, are producing excellent results in that field. It’s understandable that he would naturally gravitate toward these kinds of problems when the mind-body problem is raised. (And given his passion for integralism, it is equally understandable that he would be interested in progress in the third-person fields of cognitive science and neuroscience.) But none of this has any bearing on the “hard” mind-body problem—which is the really tough nut to crack. It is misleading, and confusing—and irrelevant—to bring these other “easy” problems into a discussion of the really “hard problem.” And it is plainly wrong to claim to have provided a solution to “the mind-body problem” by describing progress in these other fields.

Because the “hard” mind-body problem is conceptual (created by our categorizing minds), its solution should also be conceptual—and, if concepts fail us, then ultimately its resolution must be experiential. And so we come to Wilber’s description of the really hard problem:

(3) Perhaps the most important aspect of the mind-body problem involves the relation of interiors and exteriors, or the relation of subject and object. . . . In my opinion—and I explicitly state this not only in Integral Psychology but in the article appearing in the same JCS volume as de Quincey’s—the solution to #3a is best handled by a type of Whiteheadian process philosophy, and the solution to #3b is best handled by a type of Zen awakening or satori.

A few paragraphs earlier, Wilber threw in the nonsequitur: “de Quincey consistently mistakes my position that there are pre-rational feelings to mean that all feeling is merely pre-rational, which is exactly the opposite of my actual stance.” Aside from the fact that I’m sure Wilber must be aware of transrational feelings because feeling (i.e., prehension) is an essential characteristic of interiority per se (at any level, pre- or trans-), Wilber’s “pre/trans” distinction has nothing to do with solving the “hard” mind-body problem. It’s not merely transrational knowing that may help us out of the mind-body “snarl” but extrarational knowing—and this may be either somatic (“pre-“) or mystical (“post-“) forms of prehension or feeling.

However, (and this is a point I emphasize in my JCS paper), a full “unsnarling” of the world knot will likely involve both rational/mental and feeling/somatic disclosures—simply because we are, after all, dealing with the mind-body problem. We need to feel the solution, as much as think it.

Now, as I’m sure Wilber would be quick to point out, from the perspective of reason, such a “solution” would be merely “promissory”: One day, when we develop our feeling-somatic capacities sufficiently, we will get to a mind-body solution. This is just as promissory as Wilber’s proposed transrational solution: One day, when we get to satori, a genuinely nondual solution will be disclosed. From the perspective of reason, neither the somatic feeling solution nor the transrational mystical solution can be fully grasped. Both are extrarational.

I suspect that Wilber and I may agree at least on this one point. However, I maintain that neither the somatic nor the transrational “promise” is a satisfactory solution (or “resolution”) to the mind-body problem. Even if there are people (living today or in the past) who have highly developed somatic and transrational faculties, sufficient to “see-through” the rationally-created mind-body conundrum, their understanding would not amount to a satisfactory solution from the perspective of reason, where the mind-body problem was created in the first place—and, therefore, such “solutions” would remain promissory.

Where Wilber and I differ, I think, is that although we both acknowledge the actuality of extrarational epistemologies (we both have models that include nonrational ways of knowing), I do not claim that my model provides a solution to the mind-body problem, whereas in IP Wilber does make such a claim for his all-quadrant/all-level model. An extrarational solution, if there is one, is not to be found in Wilber’s model (which is thoroughly rational). Even if a rational model can point to what is beyond itself (e.g., a nondual satori or a feeling-somatic disclosure)—even to the point of naming extrarational states or stages (such as causal or nondual)—such pointing or naming does not itself amount to the proposed nonrational solution. The mind-body solution remains outside the reach of the model—Wilber’s or anyone else’s.

In a nutshell, a symbolic placeholder for an extrarational experience is not the experience itself. This is far from an original insight: We’ve had it in Zen for centuries: “The finger pointing at the moon is not the moon” (and in art: “Ce n’est pas une pipe” [by the way, for an engaging, very nonrational, visual experience of this, go to http://www.lillianball.com/pipe.html ]).

So, although Wilber and I may agree on where to look for a possible resolution to the mind-body problem—in nonrational disclosure—we disagree that it is to be found in Wilber’s quadrant/level model. That’s the point I made in my JCS critique.

I also make the point (in “Consciousness: Truth or Wisdom?”) that “clear” or “grounded” reason (i.e., reason that has not lost touch with, or has reconnected with, its somatic-feeling origins), as distinct from “distorted” or “abstract” reason (lost in the short-circuits of its own abstractions) can take us to new levels of rational insight and wisdom. It is here, using the wisdom of both body and mind, that we may find an answer to the mind-body problem. But, to repeat, the promise of such an answer is not the answer itself. Furthermore, I make the point in my JCS paper that if we engage both the feelings of our body and the rational faculties of the mind, we can see that Whitehead’s process solution to the mind-body problem is probably the closest that reason has yet come to offering us a solution. So, reason, as in Whitehead, can take us much further than the mere claim or promise of a solution that Wilber makes for his model.

Before I leave the mind-body issue, and how Wilber and I differ on this, I want to pick up one more example of how Wilber presents a disingenuous case in his defense. Again:

In my opinion—and I explicitly state this not only in Integral Psychology but in the article appearing in the same JCS volume as de Quincey’s—the solution to #3a is best handled by a type of Whiteheadian process philosophy, and the solution to #3b is best handled by a type of Zen awakening or satori.

And a few paragraphs later:

When it comes to my four proposed solutions for the four interrelated aspects of the mind-body problem, de Quincey again mixes and matches my suggestions in a way that left me breathless with my dumbness. But unfortunately, the very article appearing alongside of de Quincey’s in the same JCS issue directly contradicts every major assertion he makes about my proposed solutions (see below).

First, I searched again through IP for Wilber’s statement that the solution to “#3” (i.e., a rational solution to the mind-body problem) is best handled by a Whiteheadian process philosophy, but I couldn’t find it (either in the main text or “buried in the footnotes”). He does state, however, over and over, that the solution (to “#4”) is best handled by mystical transrational disclosure. As far as I can see, this distinction (between “#3, the relative” [rational] and “#4, the absolute” [mystical] mind-body solution) is new for Wilber following my critique of IP. (In fact, it is quite possible that Wilber introduced this distinction between #3a [a rational approach to the mind-body problem, best attempted by a Whiteheadian process analysis] and #3b [a transrational “dissolution” of the problem, best approached in some nondual state such as satori] because he had the advantage of reading my critique in advance. Since I know (because he admits it) that he was aware of my critique of his views on intersubjectivity prior to its publication in JCS, I would not be surprised to learn that he had managed to get hold of an advance version of my JCS manuscript as it circulated among the dozen or so peer reviewers.)

Second, I’m not sure what I’m supposed to make of his rebuttal that “[my/ Wilber’s] article appearing alongside de Quincey’s in the same JCS issue directly contradicts every major assertion he makes about my proposed solutions.” Even if this claim were accurate it’s beside the point because such “contradictions” have no bearing on my critique of what Wilber said about the mind-body problem in IP. Again, not having the gift of precognition, there was no way I could have had foreknowledge of what Wilber might say in his JCS article, which I could have seen only after I had written my critique.

As I reread Wilber’s response, I see something in almost every page (almost every paragraph!) that I take issue with. I have neither the time nor the inclination to dissect and respond to every error, distortion, and misunderstanding. At this rate, I’d be writing another book. So, I’ll let my response so far serve as an indication of the kinds of “misrepresentations” Wilber has offered as his reply to my critique, and of how I might respond in turn.

However, I can’t complete this “Response to Wilber” without saying something about his “rebuttal” of my critique of how he characterizes panpsychism. I’ll begin the next section with yet one more example of Wilber claiming, erroneously, that I “subtly retracted” my critique.

• Critics Do. Critics Don't. (4)
  A Response to Ken Wilber