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The focus of science was on analysis of the individual parts—treated as independent components of the machine of nature. By observing how these parts are constituted and how they causally interact, it was believed, science could build up a rational picture of how the whole was mechanically connected. The whole, then—whether an atom, molecule, living cell, human or animal body, or nature itself—could, at least in principle, be understood exclusively in terms of the mechanical, causal interactions of its constituent parts. The idea that the whole might have some autonomous causal role that might influence the behavior or organization of its individual parts was dismissed as unscientific fancy. Such “holistic” ideas were seen as hang-overs from premodern superstition, irrational belief in the possibility and actuality of “downward causation” through the “great chain of being.” According to modernist thought, the “mechanism” of any interaction in nature must always be understood in terms of upward causation—where the fundamental micro constituents cause the properties and behavior of the macro objects. Upward causation, then, is the flipside of reductionism. Summary of Paradigms With this brief background sketch of the origins of modernism as a reaction to the medieval paradigm of “occult” sympathies and influences, we can now summarize the essential points that distinguish the premodern, modern, and postmodern paradigms: • Premodern paradigm—Age of faith/superstition. Knowledge is derived from authority; meaning is derived from sympathies between things, as in the Hermetic doctrine of “As above, so below.” Causality is of four types: material, efficient, formal, final. Guiding metaphor: Created organism. • Modernist paradigm—Age of reason/empiricism/science. Age of analysis/reductionism/individualism/mechanism. Efficient causality, mechanical causality, is the only way things move or change. Guiding metaphor: Machine. • Deconstructive Postmodern paradigm—Age of relativity. All knowledge as correspondence between ideas and reality is reducible to linguistic and/or social and historical constructions. Causality is context dependent. Meaning is foundationless. Guiding metaphor: Text. Implicit in this characterization of postmodernism is a move beyond the limitations of reductionism and rational analysis—beyond rationality. Such postmodern moves are seen, for instance, in the anti-rational philosophies of Paul Feyerabend (1924-1993), and of deconstructionists and superstructuralists such as Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Jacques Derrida (1930—), and Jürgen Habermas (1929—). “Postmodernism” in this sense is seen as the final end of metaphysics and even of philosophy, where not only rationalism, but all meaning and knowledge are declared to be without foundation. Constructive Postmodernism However, there is a very different form of postmodernism where, unlike the deconstructionist version, emphasis is placed on holism and interdependence, and where rationalism is not jettisoned. • Constructive Postmodern Paradigm—Age of holism and interdependence. Age of systems. Causality is mutually-dependent and includes self-causation along with efficient causation. Guiding metaphor: Self-organizing systems. This other postmodernism is positive and optimistic, unlike the nihilism of deconstructionism. Some writers, such as John Cobb and David Griffin (Griffin, 1993) have suggested that “deconstructive postmodernism” is really a form of “late-late modernism” or “most-modernism,” and does not really qualify as “postmodernism.” True postmodernism has been characterized by Charlene Spretnak (1991) as “ecological postmodernism,” and by Griffin as “constructive postmodernism” (also as “reconstructive postmodernism”) (1993; 1994). I will take up the topic of “constructive postmodernism” again in chapter 00, “Whitehead’s Postmodern Cosmology.” Summary The roots of modernism run deep into the changes in European consciousness that erupted during the Renaissance. The main progenitors of this profound shift were philosophers such as Bacon and Descartes who laid the foundations for a new science. The net effect of this change in perspective from the preceding “Age of Faith” of the medieval period, was the rise of a new paradigm guided by ideals of empiricism, rationalism, and mechanism. However, as Whitehead has argued, the most significant characteristic of modernism was a move away from rationalism toward Baconian empiricism (see chapter 00, “Whitehead’s Postmodern Cosmology”), with its implicit program for a science based on reductionism, mechanism, and materialism. This approach lead to a movement in philosophy and eventually in psychology that took matter-in-motion as the ontological foundation for a comprehensive science of nature, including any science of mind. The modernist paradigm, then, effectively reduced mind, experience, or consciousness to the locomotion of matter. In reaction to the paradoxes and contradictions inherent in materialism, and to the consequent “loss of soul” in philosophy, science and society, a new movement is arising which aims to transcend the self-imposed limitations of the modernist program and to create a new, postmodern, paradigm. In the postmodern paradigm, philosophy of mind and science of consciousness would be based on a new set of ideals and metaphysical assumptions, foremost among these being the recognition of the ontological fundmentality of experience or consciousness. A central task for the postmodern project, then, is to return soul to philosophy, science and society not only by embodying mind, but also by “enminding” or “ensouling” matter. To cultivate the emerging postmodern paradigm, we must first of all engage in profound questioning of the basic metaphysical assumptions underlying the current worldview through which, and within which, we live our lives. That is the topic of the next chapter. |
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